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To LEND OR NOT TO LEND: WHAT THE CRA OUGHT TO SAY 
ABOUT SUB-PRIME AND PREDATORY LENDING 
Cassandra Jones Havard * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, Congress passed legislation to ensure that people 
living in racially segregated neighborhoods would have the economic 
advantages that access to credit provides. l Today, there is a dire need to 
scrutinize the broader economic and regulatory framework within which 
the mortgage lending markets operate. The new issue of predatory lending 
is both consistent with and diametrically opposite of the old problem of 
credit denials based on race and property locations. 
Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 
("ECOA") after congressional hearings revealed that commercial and 
savings banks, private-mortgage companies, and savings and loan 
institutions were denying credit to legitimate consumers and small 
businesses, thereby hindering job creation and stable communities.2 Two 
years later, <;:ongress amended the Act based on the disturbing discovery 
that lenders often denied credit to consumers based on gender, race, color, 
national origin, marital status, religion, and age.3 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Bennett 
College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Kimberlie Endres for her 
excellent research and meticulous editing skills. This article has a companion piece, 
Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit:-Evaluating the Structural Inequities of 
Sub-Prime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv. _ (forthcoming Winter 2006) (manuscript on 
file with 'the author). I would also like to thank the staff of the Florida Coastal Law 
Review. 
1 See generally Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)). See also Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act Amendments of1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976)( codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)). 
2 Congress passed The Community Reinvestment Act as Title VIII of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (1977) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1998)). The statute directs banks "to meet the credit 
needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
consistent with [the] safe and sound operation" of the bank. !d. 
3 During later hearings evaluating the statute's effectiveness, evidence was presented 
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The overwhelming consensus now, however, is that liberal access 
to credit contributes to income and wealth disparities based on race. 
Predatory lending, an outgrowth of the sub-prime lending market, is a 
market response to risk-based pricing.4 In the sub-prime market, lenders 
make higher-priced loans to borrowers with less than prime credit records. 
Far too often sub-prime loans are made to borrowers who have been 
excluded from access to credit in traditional financial markets. 5 Those 
borrowers could qualify for loans in the prime market and are unaware of 
the onerous terms of the sub-prime loan.6 
Distinguishable from sub-prime lending, predatory lending 
practices range from unfair terms hoisted on unsophisticated borrowers to 
illegal and fraudulent loan provisions.7 In predatory lending practices, 
borrowers usually have overpriced loans and no legal recourse from the 
terms ofthose loans.s Lenders who make predatory loans engage in unfair 
practices such as requiring credit insurance, high prepayment fees, and/or 
balloon payments. Predatory lenders also callously make loans without 
regard to the borrowers' ability to repay the loan. In addition, predatory 
lenders participate in fraudulent practices such as falsifying loan 
applications, forging borrowers' signatures, changing loan terms at closing, 
and misrepresenting loan terms. 
showing that lenders were denying credit and loans to consumers on the basis of gender, 
race, color, national origin, marital status, religion, and age. See 15 U.S.c. § 1691(a) 
(1996). 
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY 
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING (June 2000) [hereinafter HUD REpORT], available at 
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressreVtreasrpt.pdf (noting that while there is 
not an official definition for predatory lending, it is widely accepted that the term 
describes abusive lending practices by creditors, brokers, or any seller of home financing, 




S This is because the original lender immediately sells the loan on the secondary ~arket, 
thereby denying the borrower the ability to contest the loan's onerous provisions. See 
discussion infra Part III, B. 
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Specifically, in the home equity lending market, the absence of 
mainstream lenders in certain geographical and racial communities creates 
a ripe market for predatory lenders who target "house-rich, cash-poor," and 
oftentimes elderly consumers.9 These lenders ignore a borrower's income 
and cash flow as indicators of the borrower's ability to repay a debt and 
instead make "asset-based" loans primarily based on the borrower's home 
. 10 eqUity. 
Any analyses of access-to-capital, reverse red-lining practices, and 
disinvestment in capital-starved neighborhoods and communities reveal 
two passionately debated points: 1) the market segmentation represented 
by fringe banking activities - high-cost, high-risk lending that is predatory 
- is economically justified; and 2) fair lending laws will prevent lender 
abuses associated with mortgage reverse red-lining and discriminatory 
access to loans and credit. I I 
It is highly questionable whether, as abusive sub-prime lenders 
claim, lenders servicing the sub-prime market are democratically providing 
credit by extending credit beyond the traditional borrower base. 12 The 
higher interest rate associated with these loans makes the loans less 
affordable and harder to manage for borrowers whose income-to-debt ratio 
is marginal. Moreover, current fair lending laws promote predatory 
9 This "fringe banking" system functions as an equivalent of the prime banking system, 
offering check cashing and payment services and credit capacity. These include check 
cashing outlets, payday loan companies, rent-to-own stores, high-cost second mortgage 
companies, sub-prime auto lenders, and traditional and auto title pawn companies. The 
lending is expensive and the providers often argue that credit is not being extended as 
defined by the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1994); see also 12 C.F.R. § 
226.2(a)(14) (1999). For an overview of the fringe banking sector, see Lynn Drysdale & 
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The 
Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury 
Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REv. 589, 595-96 (2000). See also Cathy Mansfield 
Lesser, The Road to Sub-Prime HEL Was Paved with Good Intentions, 51 S.c. L. REv. 
473, 524 (2000); JAMES H. CARR & JENNY SCHUETZ, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED 
COMMUNITIES 5-7 (2001). 
IOThe distinctions between "sub-prime lending" and "equity- skimming" are often blurred. 
See Family Fin. Servo v. Spencer, 677 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). 
11 See discussion infra note 22. 
12 HUD REpORT, supra note 4, at 27. 
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lending by failing to prohibit the sale of these loans on the secondary 
market. 13 
Two critical points highlight the debate regarding the public policy 
choices in the area of sub-prime lending. First, in recent years a macro-
analysis marginalized (or even obliterated) concerns about particular 
consumer classes and has driven justification for certain practices. 14 This 
economic view of lending is devoid of the non-economic factors that 
contribute to the dilemma of borrowers faced with equity-skimming 
lending. Presently, the utilitarian view of economics dominates, endorsing 
the political view that the free market operates without interference. 
Whether this is an informed viewpoint in the area of home-equity lending 
is debatable. Second, differences among individuals necessitate a 
diversified financial services industry, allowing consumers and providers 
to make fundamental decisions about the availability of financial services. 
This point is consistent with the overriding principle that access to funds is 
a fundamental premise of sub-prime lending. 
The second point lays the groundwork for the argument that to 
protect financially vulnerable borrowers, it must be acknowledged that the 
integration of the banking regulatory system and the law's rule on 
commercial negotiation represents an essential tool to protecting sub-prime 
borrowers generally, and people of color particularly, from predatory 
lending practices. However, not all sub-prime lending is predatory. To 
some borrowers, sub-prime lending provides short-term financial 
benefits. IS Nevertheless, predatory lending is the result of market 
information failure that leads to an onerous type of borrower market 
segmentation. The question becomes how to regulate predatory practices 
13 See generally Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1994). 
14 Without calculating the costs of residential foreclosures, one estimate is that predatory 
lending costs borrowers $9.1 billion annually. ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC 
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING: A REpORT FROM THE COALmON FOR RESPONsmLE 
LENDING 2, available at http://www.responsiblelending.orglpdfs/QuantlO-Ol.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
15 As one law professor has argued in the context of providing health care access to the 
elderly, "[g]ood public policy cannot be made in this area by decision makers who are 
'color-blind' or 'class-blind .... See FrankM. McClellan, Is Managed Care Good/or What 
Ails You? Ruminations on Race, Age and Class, 44 VILL. L. REv. 227, 234 (1999). 
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so that fairly-priced loans are made available to that segment of borrowers. 
The result will be to limit the loss of home ownership due to onerous 
lending terms. 
Closer adherence to the rules of commercial negotiation would 
place more scrutiny on both the funding of predatory lenders by the 
primary market and the selling of predatory loans on the secondary market. 
In particular, the originating lender's failure to engage in a due diligence 
analysis, which examines factors such as an adequate ability to repay 
determination, the inclusion of financially onerous terms, or the effect of 
the foreclosure on an economically distressed community, is the type of 
relevant misconduct that ought to be the basis for a denial of assignment 
and negotiability under the holder in due course doctrine. In this regard, 
restricting the capital supply of predatory lenders is critical to eliminating 
the sharp practices presently sanctioned by law. 16 
This article has five parts. Part IT discusses the Community 
Reinvestment Act ("CRA,,)17 and why the current statutory scheme is 
inadequate. Part II also describes the current validation of utilitarian 
policy-making, which serves as a back-drop for illustrating, in Part ill, how 
a more integrated federal regulatory scheme could control such 
opportunistic behavior. Part ill discusses the relationships between sub-
prime lending, the CRA, and federally-insured lending institutions. That 
discussion serves as a backdrop to explain why a more integrated federal 
regulatory scheme should control this type of opportunistic behavior. Part 
IV discusses how the practices of broke ring, purchasing, and steering loans 
justify limiting the holder in due course doctrine. It goes on to argue why 
that doctrine ought to be limited by restricting assignee liability. Finally, 
Part V outlines the regulatory reforms needed to limit abusive lending and 
illustrates that ineffective fair lending laws aid lenders in concealing 
abusive behavior. To better protect borrowers, the policies underlying the 
16 Professor Eggert's excellent body of work discusses in detail how the secondary 
markets have financed predatory lenders and effectively transferred the risk ofloss from 
the lenders to homeowners. See Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, 
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503 
(2002). 
17 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994) 
[hereinafter CRA]. 
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prohibited practices that result in unfairness must be policed and corrected. 
Part VI concludes by placing the issue of predatory lending within the 
larger issue of economic justice. There is a need to develop a paradigm 
that ensures that economic freedoms are protected. 
II. THE ENFORCEMENT VOID 
Congress passed the CRA to require banks to lend in the 
communities in which the banks are located. IS The CRA is silent about 
sub-prime lending because sub-prime lending was virtually nonexistent 
when the statute was enacted. More recently, Congress amended the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA"), 19 a 
companion statute to the Truth in Lending statute, to address some issues 
of abusive lending. Still, how lenders fund abusive lending or use the 
loans to receive CRA credit has not been addressed. 
A. HOEPA 
Congress passed HOEPA in 1994 to stem the growth of certain 
predatory lending practices.20 HOEP A amended the Truth in Lending Act 
("TILA") and provides special protections for consumers in certain non-
purchase, high-cost loans secured by their homes.21 In loans covered by 
HOEPA, the lender must give the borrower certain disclosures, in writing, 
at least three business days before closing.22 This information includes a 
notice that the consumer could lose her home and any money put into it, if 
she does not satisfy her loan obligations.23 The notice also requires 
disclosure of the annual percentage rate, amount of payments, and certain 
18 See, e.g., s. REp. No. 95-175, at 33 (1977)(commentingthat "[T]he Committee is aware 
of amply documented cases of red-lining, in which local lenders export savings despite 
sound local lending opportunities. Only recently, under the constraint ofa lawsuit by civil 
rights groups and two highly critical oversight reports by this Committee, has the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board begun to adopt an anti-red lining program"). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2000). 
20 !d. See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a) (2000). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2000). 
2212 C.F.R. § 226.31(c)(I) (2000). 
23 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(1) (2000). 
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applicable variable rate information.24 The law also bans from high-rate, 
high-fee loans such terms as balloon payments due in less than five years, 
increasing the interest rate at default, and most prepayment penalties?S 
These disclosures are in addition to the other TILA disclosures that must 
be made no later than the closing ofthe loan.26 Lenders are also prohibited 
from engaging in a pattern or practice of lending based on home equity, 
without regard to the consumer's ability to repay loans, and making direct 
payments to home improvement contractors.27 HOEPA amends the TILA 
and addresses certain deceptive and unfair practices in certain home equity 
lending.28 However, these acts do not cover loans to buy or build a home, 
reverse mortgages, or home equity lines of credit. 
While HOEP A was intended to curb predatory lending practices, 
such protections must be extended in order to address current trends?9 
24 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(1)-(4) (2000). 
25 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (d)(1)-(6) (2000). 
26 HOEP A prohibits the following practices: all balloon payments, except for bridge loans 
of less than one year used by consumers to buy or build a home; negative amortization; 
default interest rates higher than pre-default rates; rebates of interest upon default 
calculated by any method less favorable than the actuarial method; a repayment schedule 
that consolidates more than two periodic payments that are to be paid in advance from the 
proceeds of the loan; most prepayment penalties, including refunds of unearned interest 
calculated by any method less favorable than the actuarial method; a due-on-demand 
clause. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639. Creditors also may not make loans based on the collateral 
value of property without regard to ability to repay the loan. The prohibition also applies 
to assignees holding or servicing the loan. Id. at § 1639(h). 
27 12 C.F.R. § 512(b) (2002). 
28 A loan is covered by the law if it meets the following tests: 
[F]or a fIrst-lien loan, that is, the original mortgage on the property, the 
annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds by more than eight percentage 
points the rates on Treasury securities of comparable maturity; for a 
second-lien loan, that is, a second mortgage, the APR exceeds by more 
than 10 percentage points the rates in Treasury securities of comparable 
maturity; or the total fees and points payable by the consumer at or 
before closing exceed the larger of $499 or eight percent of the total 
loan amount ... Credit insurance premiums for insurance written in 
connection with the credit transaction are counted as fees. 
Federal Trade Commission, High-Rate, High-Fee Loans (HOEP AlSection 32 Mortgages), 
at http://permanent.access. gpo. gov Iwebsites/www.ftc.govlbcp/conline/pubs/homes/32 
mortgs.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
29 Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial 
8 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: 1 
First, HOEPA does not limit the amount of the lender's up-front charges 
and costs, or the points and closing costs, which are financed in the loan. 
The excessive fees found in closing costs, credit insurance premiums, and 
points deplete the equity in the home. A lender who re-finances a home 
repeatedly receives these fees and costs immediately upon the loan's 
closing. Second, HOEPA's interest rate trigger and the points and fees 
trigger are too high, allowing many abusive lenders to avoid HOEPA 
strictures by making high-cost loans just under the trigger.30 The weakness 
of the statute is also illustrated by the lender's ability to circumvent the law 
by transforming the transaction. Finally, open-end credit provides an 
opportunity for mortgage abuse. Since HOEPA's passage in 1994, the 
mortgage finance environment has changed dramatically. Without 
restrictions on open-end loans, a lender has an incentive to make loans that 
are not legally restricted, but that are against the spirit of the law.31 
Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 129 (2002). Cj Michael J. Pyle, A "Flip" Look at 
Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End Abusive Refinancing 
Practices?, Il2 YALE L.J. 1919 (2003) (discussing the antiflipping amendment to 
Regulation Z as an ineffective change because it will be over-enforced). 
30 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale 0/ Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics o/Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1307-08 (2002) (recommending 
suitability as a means to curb predatory lending while encouraging beneficial market 
activity). 
31 Two other statutes serve a policing function for consumers, indirectly and directly. The 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), enacted by Congress in 1975 and implemented 
by the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation C, requires lending institutions to report public 
loan data. Data collected under HMDA are used to help the public determine iflending 
institutions are meeting the housing credit needs of their communities, to help public 
officials target community development investment, arid to help regulators enforce fair 
lending laws. The HMDA data collection requirements include mortgage lenders not 
affiliated with depository institutions or holding companies and also requires reporting of 
data regarding the disposition of applications for mortgage and home improvement loans, 
in addition to data regarding loan originations and purchases and requires most lenders to 
identify the race, sex, and income ofloan applicants and borrowers. See 12 U.S.c. §§ 
2801 to 2804 (1975). 
Another statute, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESP A), a consumer 
protection statute passed in 1974, covers loans secured with a mortgage placed on a one-
to-four family residential property. These include most purchase loans, assumptions, 
refinances, property improvement loans, and equity lines of credit. RESP A requires that 
borrowers receive disclosures at various times. Some disclosures spell out the costs 
associated with the settlement, outline lender servicing and escrow account practices, and 
describe business relationships between settlement service providers. RESP A also 
2005] Havard 9 
B. TheCRA 
The CRA requires depository institutions with assets over $10 
million to report mortgage lending totals in metropolitan areas aggregated 
by census tract. 32 The law directs federally-insured depository institutions 
to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe 
and sound banking operations.33 To evaluate compliance, federal banking 
regulators evaluate an institution's lending, service, and investment 
activities.34 
The criticisms surrounding the CRA from various housing 
advocates are numerous, including allegations of vagueness and 
burdensome paperwork by bankers,35 unprofitable lending 
neighborhoods/6 inadequate enforcement, and failure to raise the actual 
lending in low-income and minority communities.37 
In response to some ofthe criticisms, Congress, in 1999, amended 
the CRA in the Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Modernization Act 
prohibits certain practices that increase the cost of settlement services. 12 U.S.C. §§ 
2601-2603 (1974). 
32 See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000). See also Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809) (1999) [hereinafter GLBA]. 
33 See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (b) (2000). The CRA is implemented by Regulations 12 C.F.R. 
parts 25, 228, 345, and 563e. 
34 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2906(b)(I)(A), 2906(b)(2) (2005); 12 C.F.R. § 25.28 (2005) (Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter OCC]; 12 C.F.R. § 228.28 (2005) 
[hereinafter FRB]; 12 C.F.R. § 345.28 (2005) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 
[hereinafter FDIC]; 12 C.F.R. § 563e.28 (2005) (Office of Thrift Supervision) [hereinafter 
OTS]. 
35 The seminal work in the field remains that of Professors Macy and Miller. Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 
79 VA. L. REv. 291, 298 (1993); see also Gary M. Swidler, Making the Community 
Reinvestment Act Work, 69N.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 390-94 (1994). 
36 Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social Responsibility 
in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 76 (2000). 
37 Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but 
Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293 (1993). 
10 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: I' 
(GLBA).38 GLBA mandates that depository institutions must have 
satisfactory eRA ratings before the institution, or its holding company, 
affiliates, or subsidiaries, can engage in any of the expanded financial 
activities permitted under the law.39 The GLBA's sunshine provision 
requires that agreements entered into by depository institutions and 
community organizations or other entities, in fulfillment of eRA 
obligations, must be publicly disclosed.4o The GLBA also changed the 
frequency of small banks' exams.41 However, all banks remain subject to 
eRA review at the time of any application for merger, to open or close a 
branch, or at the discretion of regulators for reasonable cause.42 Instead, 
the acquiring institution and the protesting community group or 
responsible regulatory agency generally reach a settlement. Though the 
forms of settlements may vary substantially, institutions are usually 
required to make substantial eRA commitments.43 
As a result of the federal regulator'S authority to review an 
application for merger or branch closure, the public has become 
knowledgeable about a lending institution's obligation to the communities 
that it serves and the industry has become increasingly responsive.44 eRA 
38 GLBA, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (mainly codified at 12 and 15 
U.S.C. (2005)). 
39 See GLBA § 711, 113 Stat. 1465 (codified at 12 U.S,C. § 1831y(a) (2000) and 
implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 25.29 (2005) (OCC), 12 C.F.R. § 228.29 (2005) (FRB), 12 
C.F.R. § 345.29 (2005) (FDIC), and 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29 (2005) (OTS)). 
40 GLBA § 711,113 Stat. 1465 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831y(a) (2000)). At least one 
commentator has argued that the sunshine provisions have a "chilling effect" on CRA 
activities. Deborah Goldberg, Remarks of Deborah Goldberg, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 67, 69 (2000). 
41 Small banks with an outstanding rating are subject to review once every five years, 
every four years for those with a satisfactory rating, and as deemed necessary for 
institutions whose last rating was less than satisfactory. GLBA § 712, 113 Stat. 1469 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2908 (2000)). 
4212 C.F.R. § 25.29(a) (2005) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(a) (2005) (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 
345.29(a) (2005) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29(a) (2005) (OTS). 
43 Joseph Moore, Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on Bank Mergers, 1 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 412, 427 (1997). 
44 Earlier research indicated that profitability of CRA loans lagged behind that of overall 
home purchase and refinance loans. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Financial Services 
Modernization Provides an Opportunity For Increased Responsiveness to Community 
Needs, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 177, 185 (2001). 
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enforcement remains an issue. The challenges do not usually result in the 
denial of a merger application, although it is a relevant factor in the 
assessment ofa proposed transaction.45 The Act does not, and never has, 
provided a private right of action. Regardless, regulators are giving 
substantially more attention to eRA records and agreements and whether 
they are being upheld after the merger. 
III. ECONOMIC UTILITARIANISM 
The economic and racial mix of predatory lending and loss of home 
ownership requires scrutinizing the results under theories of social justice 
and equality. The argument that lending is color-blind is flawed when 
lenders' conduct bespeaks bias and racial animus in identifying lending 
opportunities.46 The economic and financial consequences attendant in 
lending options reveal that economic decisions are at times based 
impermissibly on race. The industry must recognize that such 
discriminatory conduct is not legitimate in the economic order. 
The concern with the social consequences of segmentation is that 
the segmentation is based on a utilitarian economic perspective and in that 
regard denies the value that individuals place on home ownership. This 
particular view also undercuts the ability and sanctity of the individual to 
negotiate terms that are critical to good pricing of a loan. 
A. Utilitarianism Defined 
Arguably, what has occurred in the financial services industry is 
regulatory lending policy that has become utilitarian in nature. In the 
consumer lending area, the policy that supports predatory lending treats the 
consequences as more important than the individual dignity of the 
borrower.47 
45 See generally Joseph Moore, Community Reinvestment Act and It's Impact on Bank 
Mergers, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 412 (1997). 
46 Cecil J. Hunt II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory 
Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. ToL. L. REv. 211 (2003). 
47 Mark S. Campisano, Ordinary Observing and Utilitarian Policymaking in the Internal 
Revenue Code, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 785,827 (1982). 
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Utilitarianism is defined as sacrificing individual autonomy, for the 
maximization of good.48 Utilitarianism ignores the expectations of any 
one individual if the satisfaction of the group can be achieved. The 
decision that produces the greatest good or utility is the right one.49 The 
expectations of individuals or inconsistencies regarding the outcome of a 
particular policy are ignored so long as the economic interests or material 
ends have been met.50 
The utilitarian economic view evaluates harm in terms ofthe risk to 
the affected group. The concerns of an individual are measured in light of 
the probability of harm and the magnitude ofloss to others who are either 
identically or similarly situated. 51 Inherent within this school ofthought is 
the free-market regulatory paradigm that the market will achieve optimal 
results and will not support inefficient ones. The corollary is that there 
should be no market interference through external regulation.52 
Proponents of this approach argue that any market regulation 
should be tested under a cost-benefit analysis.53 This is in part due to the 
supposition that regulators act outside of the market and may hamper 
48 See J.J.C. SMART, UTILITARIANISM IN THE ENCYCWPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Paul 
Edwards ed., 1969) (discussing the history and critical analysis of utilitarian thought). See 
also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION, Ch. X (1996). 
49 Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 163, 
191 (2001). 
50 "The utilitarian policymaker accords no special value to 'lay expectations,' which may 
well be founded on outdated custom or simple ignorance and which are often muddled or 
inconsistent with one another. Rather, he evaluates the goodness or propriety of a 
proposed legal rule by reference to his own comprehensive philosophical system, 
utilitarianism." Campisano, supra note 47, at 788. 
51 M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through 
the Lenses of Corrective Justice and EffiCiency, 32 GA. L. REv. 1017, 1045 (1998). 
52 See Thomas O. McGarity, The APA at Fifty: The Expanded Debate Over the Future Of 
the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1463, 1492 (1996) (discussing the preferability 
and efficiency of the free market over regulated markets). See also Barry J. Rodger, 
Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 COLUM. 1. 
EUR. L. 289, 299 (2000) (discussing that state inaction can steer the economy towards 
desired goals). 
53 John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 13,47 (2002). 
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market efficiencies. Market efficiency is synonymous with satisfying 
individual wants. A risk-based system of regulation substitutes 
protectionist oversight with a cost-benefit analysis. This analysis is a 
surrogate market discipline on regulators to ensure that the consequences 
do not hamper market efficiencies. By identifying the intended and 
expected consequences, a systematic approach reveals areas of concern and 
matches those areas with data which determines the future course of 
action. 
B. Sub-Prime Lending as a Utilitarianism Lending Policy 
Analyzing predatory lending under a utilitarian economic approach 
requires considering two equally important components. One component 
evaluates the consequences for the individual and the other evaluates the 
aggregate measure of the good. 54 Using utilitarianism, the first component 
asks whether the borrower has made a consequential analysis of the 
decision to enter into a high interest rate loan. The second component 
evaluates the purpose and function of the default rules in terms of 
producing utilitarian conduct. The main function of the foreclosure rules is 
to re-capture the lender's investment in the transaction. 
The two components yield independent results, justifying and 
negating, in tandem, the use of the theory. A central tenet of traditional 
utilitarian philosophy is that property rights should be exercised in such a 
way as to promote happiness.55 This tenet explains that homeowners ought 
to make complex financial decisions in their own best interest at the given 
time, therefore making a balancing of the lender's harm with the 
borrower's injury appropriate. The borrower's harm is contingent on 
whether the lender's conduct is legally sanctioned as an acceptable social 
norm. In this regard, the economic perspective sanctions the lender's 
wealth-maximizing conduct regardless of the injurious behavior. The 
lender's behavior, when and if it is discovered, is justified as a legitimate 
54 Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine o/Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO 
L. REv. 1693, 1719 (1995). 
55 See Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret 0/ Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights 
Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 111, 179 (2000) (discussing the central tenet of 
traditional utilitarian philosophy is unattainable in the case of biotechnological 
inventions). 
14 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: 1 
cost of doing business. 
A prevalent assumption of sub-prime lending is that the borrower is 
at fault for making an economically poor decision to enter into the 
transaction. This economic rationalization denies the lender's fault based 
on the borrower's judgment to enter into the transaction. More pointedly, 
the criticism is that a doctrine protecting borrowers is paternalistic. 56 That 
argument asserts that the borrower makes an economic decision that is in 
her best interests. Another perspective to consider is that the increased 
participation in the sub-prime market by mainstream financial institutions 
is a result of the deregulation and the freedom that exists in the consumer 
credit market. Lenders are able to design products that conform to 
regulation and then "export" the consumer credit regulation, strict or 
lenient, from the state in which they are located to all other states where 
they have customers.57 
Utilitarian economic policy, which rationalizes, and in some cases 
disregards, the effect of policies on the individual harm, best explains the 
choice for failing to monitor this industry. Legitimate risk-based pricing 
bridges the informational deficiencies and offers a more balanced cost of 
obtaining information in low- and moderate-income communities as to 
who may be creditworthy. 
IV. eRA AND PREDATORY LENDING 
Predatory lending manifests itself in several ways, directly and 
indirectly, as it relates to the activities of federally-insured financial 
institutions. The involvement of banks may result in the banks receiving 
CRA credit under the CRA lending and investment tests. The question is 
whether the current regulatory scheme adequately polices the involvement 
of banks, directly or indirectly, and effectively imposes some type of 
sanction on federally-insured institutions and their affiliates for this 
56 See Kurt Eggert, Striking a Balance: Basic Questions About Consumer Protection Law, 
7 CHAP. L. REv. 1,2 (2004) (arguing that too much consumer protection could lead to a 
paternalistic restriction of consumers' autonomy). 
57 Elizabeth R. Schultz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and 
Its Effect on Predatory Lending, 88 MINN. L. REv. 518, 522 (2004). 
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behavior. What follows is a discussion of how the eRA and predatory 
lending often overlap in various settings. 
A. Brokering Loans 
Predatory lending is not sanctioned by the federal regulatory 
regime. Whether banks engage in originating predatory lending mayor 
may not be detectable by banking regulators. 58 By brokering loans, banks 
fund and then assign loans to the originating lender, holding them briefly. 
Yet serving as a mortgage broker allows a bank to receive eRA credit 
under two of the three eRA tests: lending and service. When banks briefly 
fund loans, assign them to the originating lender, or perform settlement 
functions, the banks receive credit under the eRA lending test. The 
settlement function and the acceptance of applications as a broker, may 
qualify for eRA credit under the service test. In addition, banks may also 
support predatory lending indirectly by purchasing the loans as an 
investment, financing non-bank sub-prime loans, or by participating in the 
securitization process; again, eRA credit may be received. 
B. Purchase of Loans 
The purchase of predatory loans, or loans by another lender, may 
meet lending test criteria under the eRA. The purchase of mortgage-
backed securities backed by predatory loans made to low- and moderate-
income borrowers may qualify for the eRA investment test credit. It is 
noteworthy that the indirect financing of predatory lending occurs when 
banks finance non-bank lenders through working capital loans and loan 
guarantees. 59 
58 Banks engaging in predatory lending activities are engaging in high-risk lending and 
therefore pose a higher risk ofloss to the insurance fund. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTlNG 
OFFICE, GAO-02-419T, BANK REGULATION: ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF SUPERIOR 
BANK, FSB, HINSDALE, ILLINOIS 8 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
Id02419t.pd£ 
59 Dan Reynolds, Predatory Lending in Oregon: Does Oregon Need an Anti-predatory 
Lending Law, or Do Current Laws and Remedies Suffice?, 83 OR. L. REv. 1081, 1100 
(2004) (citing reputational risks among the reasons that federally regulated institutions do 
not make sub-prime loans). In 2001, the FTC named Citigroup Inc. and CitiFinancial 
Credit Company, successor to the Associates, as defendants in a predatory lending action. 
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges One of Nation's Largest 
16 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: 1 
C. Steering to Non-Bank Affiliates 
Finally, a more common problem that only the most sophisticated 
borrower recognizes is the steering of prime borrowers to sub-prime and 
predatory lenders. Benefiting from the incentive payments of yield spread 
premiums, loan officers encourage would-be prime borrowers to accept 
higher interest rate loans. Banks themselves may steer customers into the 
bank's in-house sub-prime products; however, banks may also steer 
customers to the bank's sub-prime non-bank affiliates.6o 
D. Limiting the Holder in Due Course Doctrine 
1. The Doctrine 
The holder in due course doctrine historically has increased the 
transferability and liquidity of negotiable instruments.61 Purchasers of 
negotiable instruments are protected by the holder in due course doctrine, 
Subprime Lenders with Abusive Lending Practices: Associates First Capital Corporation 
and Its Successors Citigroup Inc. and CitiFinancial Credit Company Named in Complaint 
(Mar. 7,2001), at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/news/01l0307a.html (last visited Sept. 
17,2005). 
60 Federally-insured banks are not themselves able to make sub-prime loans but often use 
their affiliates to participate in the sub-prime market. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The acC's 
Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 
313 (2004). 
61 This doctrine is currently found in U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005), which defines a holder in due 
course as the holder of an instrument if: 
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear 
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so 
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and (2) 
the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) 
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or 
that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another 
instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the 
instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) 
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in § 3-306, and 
(vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment 
described in § 3-305(a). 
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which allows them to limit risks.62 The doctrine protects the purchasers 
from the claims of any other parties and from the defenses that a borrower 
may assert.63 An instrument that appears valid on its face allows a 
purchaser to reasonably conclude that the obligation is a valid one. Thus, 
an assignee claiming the rights of a holder in due course may begin 
foreclosure payments when a homeowner fails to make timely payments. 
The doctrine turns a negotiable instrument into a replacement for currency 
by relieving the purchaser of any claims and defenses that the maker may 
have.64 
In the home mortgage context, the holder in due course doctrine 
protects both the originator and the assignee ofthe negotiable instrument. 
By passing the risk on to the secondary market purchaser or assignee, the 
original lender is able to escape the consequences of making an 
overreaching loan. The assignee, as a bona fide purchaser, protects itself 
from the borrower's defenses, which could have been raised against the 
originator. Thus, the doctrine provides no protection for a borrower 
against an assignee outside of the traditional defenses. 
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") realized that consumers 
were being abused in retail and consumer goods transactions, so it changed 
the applicability ofthe holder in the due course rule.65 Prior to the era of 
securitization, the doctrine was inconsequential to homebuyers who needed 
to challenge the originator. The dominance of the secondary market has 
not only resulted in originators selling those mortgages to investors, but 
also has the concomitant effect of protecting those investors from any 
claims that the borrowers might have against the originator. As Eggert 
62 The doctrine of negotiability is subject to much debate recently. Some scholars argue 
that the doctrine is now arcane. See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in 
Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REv. 951 (1997). 
63 U.C.C. § 2-305 (1998). Defenses which can be asserted against a holder in due course 
include the lack of the maker's capacity to execute the instruments, duress, illegality of the 
instrument, misrepresentation of the essential character or terms of the contract, fraud that 
induced the obligor to sign the instrument or fraud with neither knowledge nor reasonable 
opportunity to learn its character and essential terms. Id. 
64 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of the Form Over 
Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 363, 366 (2002). 
65 Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 53,506, 509-10 (Nov. 18, 1975). 
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argued, predatory loan investors have been protected to the detriment of 
borrowers. 66 
The preservation of fair lending standards requires that the doctrine 
of negotiability be used to police the abuses of sub-prime lending. There 
must be a balancing of the interest of investors who purchase beneficial 
interests in loans with the interests of homeowners whose rights are 
forfeited. An underlying policy of fairness dictates that originators ought 
to be required to buy back any notes that do not meet the underwriting 
standards of the purchaser. 
2. The Equity Argument for Limiting the Doctrine: 
The Historical Context of Federal Policy 
Encouraging Lending Inequity 
In discussing the lending inequities and loss of home ownership 
through predatory lending practices, commentators oflate have described a 
dual mortgage market.67 Unfortunately, that duality has long existed in the 
federal government finance' programs designed to promote home 
ownership. 68 
The federal government's home-ownership programs, the most 
significant being the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") mortgage 
insurance program, encouraged a white suburban demography away from 
the lower property values of the minority occupied inner-cities.69 
66 Eggert, supra note 64, at 424-26. 
67 Engel and McCoy describe the market as a tri-parte, consisting of a "prime market, [ a] 
legitimate sub-prime market and a predatory market." Engel & McCoy, supra note 30, at 
1277. 
68 Joshua L. Farrell, The FHA's Origins: How its Valuation Method Fostered Racial 
Segregation and Suburban Sprawl, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEY. L. 
374,379-81 (2002). 
69 It is important to point out that FHA policy explicitly recommended racially restrictive 
covenants in appraisal standards and advised that property in which the presence of 
"inharmonious racial or nationality groups" made a neighborhood's housing undesirable 
for insurance and stated that "[in order for] a neighborhood ... to retain stability, it is 
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial 
classes . .." Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching Important Property 
Concepts: Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 665, 
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Reinforced by the lower earning capacity of its residents, inner-city 
neighborhoods continued to represent lower property values and 
consequently the attendant measures of property control and home 
ownership. These include income, wealth, and the peculiar economic 
value of home ownership. 70 Consequently, the attendant measures of 
property value, such as income and wealth, affect the value of home 
h· 71 owners Ip. 
Home ownership represents wealth accumulation.72 Minority 
residential patterns have been shaped explicitly and implicitly by the 
federal governmental financing programs.73 The FHA policies that 
encouraged suburban home purchases and made federally-insured and 
federally-guaranteed mortgage loans available predominately to whites 
caused the confinement of minorities to inner-cities.74 Private developers 
677-78 (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 54 
(1993)). See also John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: 
A Back-To-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487, 1509 (1993). 
70 See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHlWHITE 
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 38, 114 (1995) (discussing the 
wage disparity among minority workers and the failure of minority workers to benefit 
from social welfare programs designed to aid workers because of the disparities in 
income). 
71 Although homes in predominately minority neighborhoods have less property value, for 
minorities, home value represents their greatest financial asset. Nancy A. Denton, Are 
African-Americans Still Hypersegregated?, in RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN 
LEGACY 49 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994). 
72 David E. Cohn, The Community Reinvestment Act--Asset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. L. 
REv. 599,619 (1992) ("[T]he mortgage gap between African Americans and whites is 
alarming because home ownership is a principal method of increasing wealth in the United 
States. Consequently, barriers to home ownership as well as to funds for commercial 
development only serve to prevent upward economic mobility for African Americans"). 
73 See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 
229-37 (1955). "FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the 
Nuremberg Laws." !d. at 234. 
74 One researcher has reported that between 1946 and 1959, less than two percent of the 
housing financed with federal mortgage assistance went to African Americans. MARK I. 
GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA 
1933-1965221 (1975). It was President Kennedy who abated the FHA and VA practice 
of excluding minorities from participating in the government-sponsored home ownership 
programs by issuing an executive order prohibiting the continued practices of excluding 
20 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: 1 
followed the FHA's mandate of racial exclusion in order that the 
developers newly developed housing stick would meet the Insurance 
program's eligibility requirements. 75 
The historical treatment ofland and African-Americans shows how 
federal policy has had a deleterious effect on the ability of African-
Americans to accumulate wealth.76 The value of property is directly 
affected by its location. The pervasive segregation of minority 
neighborhoods has significant reverberations on property values, regardless 
of whether the homeowner is black or not. This so-called "color-coded" 
process,77 whereby minorities control less property and have less access to 
financing, has the ripple affect of curtailing access to education and 
parlaying home value into business and capital development. 78 
3. Originating Lender and Assignee Liability 
Congress can regulate the circumstances under which sub-prime 
loans thrive. Protecting borrowers requires circumscribing the protections 
that originating lenders and assignees rely upon when making loans with 
unnecessarily high rates of interest, excessive fees, and costs. More 
minorities from such programs. See Executive Order 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11517 (Nov. 
24, 1962). 
75 Cheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A 
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 729 (2001). 
76 The myth of neutral, fair, and objective decision-making in federal governmental 
policies and the importance of taking race into account has been argued for by numerous 
academics of color in numerous settings. Two such noteworthy perspectives are Neil 
Gotanda,A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 16 (1991) 
(contending that governmental policymakers use the premise of colorblindness to actually 
create racially discrimination policies); and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind 
Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as 
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 162-63 (1994) (arguing against neutrality of race 
in fashioning both forward-looking and remedial policies, commenting that "to assume 
that ignoring race in making social policy will bring about justice or achieve morality is 
legal fantasy"). 
77 Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of Racial Residential Segregation, in URBAN 
INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 217, 265 (Alice O'Connor et al. eds., 2001). 
78 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 64, at 8 (finding that "[t]he lower values of black 
homes adversely affect the ability of blacks to utilize their residences as collateral for 
obtaining personal, business, or educational loans"). 
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specifically, Congress should limit the circumstances in which originating 
lenders and assignees of high-cost mortgage loans may use the holder in 
due course doctrine. 79 
a. Restricting Assignability 
A borrower who has a contract dispute with a lender may refuse to 
pay on the contract, thereby offering the borrower some leverage to resolve 
the dispute to her satisfaction, unless the instrument is freely assignable. 
The negotiability of an instrument allows a third party, who purchases the 
instrument from the originating lender, to claim ignorance of the onerous 
circumstances surrounding the instrument. The negotiability of the 
instrument denies the mortgage borrower the legal right to refuse to pay for 
excessive fees and costs. 
Purchasing lenders engage in voluntary due diligence practices. 
This process, designed by the individual lender' s standards and secondary 
market dictates, ensures that the loans for sale are creditworthy and that the 
standards set for the legal, financial, and reputational risks are adequate. 80 
A purchaser elects to perform some loan review ofthe originating lender's 
process in order to lower the risks ofloss. Additionally, there should be a 
process for the purchaser to determine that the originator is reputable and 
financially sound. Lenders who purchase broad categories ofloans that are 
not well-defined may in fact purchase poor performing and illegal high-
costs loans. When there is a sub-prime borrower, the purchasing lender 
should significantly consider whether the originating lender has performed 
adequate due diligence to determine whether the borrower has the ability to 
repay the loan.81 Limiting the doctrine would allow the borrower to have 
79 The Federal Trade Commission regulates consumer transactions by restricting 
negotiability. The FTC's Preservation of Claims and Defense Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 
(2005), limits the applicability of the holder in due course doctrine in consumer 
transactions. 
80 See Kathleen Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Community Reinvestment Act: Twenty-
Five Year Anniversary: The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1571, 1596-97 (2002) (discussing due diligence safeguards that can protect 
purchasers of sUb-prime loans). 
81 The creditor analyzes: 1) the applicant's desire to pay, 2) the applicant's ability to pay, 
and 3) the applicant's financial strength. See Gail R. Reizenstein, A Fresh Look at the 
22 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. VII: 1 
some protection from excessive costs and fees and to raise all claims and 
defenses against the assignee which would have been available for the 
borrower to raise against the originator.82 
There is a need for clear, concise, uniform standards of assignee 
liability. Loan purchasers must have defined standards of due diligence 
that will reveal upon review of the documents whether there are violations 
of representations, warranties, and/or conditions that are necessary for 
secondary market. Determining the quality of the loans and their expected 
performance is part of the issuer's review process. 
Accordingly, the purchaser should be able to rely upon the accuracy 
of the originating lender's documentation. Therefore, assignee liability 
should occur only when the lending violations can be detected from the 
face of the loan documents. 
Loan purchasers should be responsible for policing the quality of 
the loan pools that they purchase. Secondary market purchasers arguably 
have access to a myriad of information about the loans, e.g., loan-to-value-
ratios, debt-to-income ratios, and FICO scores. An examination of loan 
documents will reveal whether the originating lender is in compliance with 
the loan restrictions. An examination ofthe loan files also reveals problem 
lenders that include balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and 
unnecessarily high fees in their transactions. 
One of the benefits of securitization and pooling is that the 
secondary market is very well protected from risks of default by borrowers. 
Purchasers have some information advantages about the originating lender 
that borrowers do not have. 
Purchasers of loans can determine if the originating lender makes 
loans with high fees and interest rates, onerous loan terms, or if the 
borrowers regularly default. Purchasers invest in the loan pools, expect 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. REv. 215, 237 (1980). 
82 Another recommendation is that Congress expand the HOEPA definition of a high-cost 
loan. Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial 
Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. Ill, 129 (2002). 
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their funds to be repaid, and receive a return on the funds; therefore, the 
burden of reasonably measuring the risks and accurately predicting the 
performance of loan pools ought to be placed on them. It is unfair to 
expect the individual consumer to be able to identify and measure such 
risks. 
Assignee liability properly places the tension between the 
originating lender and the purchaser instead of between the purchaser and 
the borrower. Inherent within this focus is that loans are originated by 
traditional lenders and brokers, as well as from non-traditional parties such 
as home improvement contractors. These parties, who have received 
financial benefit from the loan origination, also have a duty to make loans 
based on responsible lending criteria. Collecting accurate loan data, 
ensuring that loan documents are consistent with laws and regulations, and 
screening loan files for a review of the documentation of the mortgage are 
duties of the originating lender. After completing a due diligence review, 
the purchaser is able to reject those loans in which the default rates ofloan 
originators are high, the loan fees and costs are high, and those loans from 
geographical areas identified as hot-beds of predatory lending. Lending 
violations that cannot be detected in a review of the loan documents will 
ultimately limit sub-prime borrowers' access to credit. 
b. Assignee Liability is Efficient 
Assignee liability establishes the market force that will limit 
investments in predatory lending. Assigning liability to the secondary 
market is fair when purchasers, as market participants, are able to observe 
and detect bad elements of loans. Assignee liability puts the onus on the 
secondary market participants to determine which loans are predatory. 
Only when secondary market entities are accountable for the violations of 
the originating lenders will the assignees be forced to implement due 
diligence standards. 
Furthermore, fairness dictates that the borrower be allowed to 
pursue the purchaser that currently holds the loan. The borrower, unaware 
of the workings of the secondary market, is most likely uninformed that the 
loan will be sold shortly after it is made. Without assignee liability, the 
borrower may not bring a private right-of-action against a lender who 
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originates violating loans. Assuming the originating lender is solvent and 
well-capitalized, the borrowers should be spared the expense of litigation 
against the originator when foreclosure is threatened. Moreover, the 
borrower is most likely unaware that the originator may be defunct by the 
time the borrower learns that the loan terms are problematic. 
Assignee liability, when well-defined, is a prudent safeguard 
against SUb-prime mortgage lending abuses. Equally important to the 
notion oflimiting free transferability, when there is evidence of sub-prime 
lending abuse, is the limitation of monetary damages. It is important that 
assignee liability provisions predetermine the monetary exposure. Only if 
the amount of financial exposure is known will the rating agencies be able 
to calculate the damages and adequately rate the transaction.83 
A national standard of assignee liability is efficient and cost-
effective. A single federal statute should replace the myriad of state and 
local laws passed to combat sub-prime lending abuse. 84 Unlike many 
existing regulations that use subjective standards, there is a need for an 
objective determination of when assignee liability is enforceable. These 
measures of predictability ultimately protect the market that is serving this 
particular borrower segment. 
v. THE REGULATORY REFORMS 
Homeowners cannot always avoid foreclosure by refinancing. 
Faced with making a non-performing loan into a performing loan often 
requires losing some of the accumulated equity during the transaction. The 
83 Standard and Poor's considers whether the seller is selling a loan with unlimited 
assignee liability when rating a lender's secured loans for sale. Compliance with the 
applicable state statutes, including anti-predatory lending statutes therefore may result in 
loans receiving a less favorable rating. See Press Release, Standard and Poor's, Anti-
Predatory Lending Laws Assume a Prominent Role in the U.S. RMBS Market (Oct. 7, 
2003), at http://www.mbaa.orgiindustry/news/0311007a.html. 
84 As of June 2005, there were at least 129 varying state laws addressing issues having to 
do with predatory lending. Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: 
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 1,61-68 (2005) (arguing that 
federalism supports the differing predatory lending legislations of states and 
municipalities). 
2005] Havard 25 
high failure rate of the sub-prime and predatory markets indicates that 
market forces are ineffective in halting this economic abuse. Revising the 
policy structure will stop the predatory and sub-prime industry from 
operating in such an unbridled manner. 
Banking regulators can help to ameliorate the problem of predatory 
lending by expanding fair lending regulation and enforcement to develop a 
more rigorous means of evaluating the pricing and terms of loans to 
determine how costly the loans are. What banking regulators can do to 
change some of the operational issues that result in predatory lending is 
discussed below. Specifically, the CRA ought to be amended to require 
regulators to examine these lending practices more closely. 
A. Banking Affiliates and Sub-Prime Lending 
To help regulate what has become an abusive market, federally-
insured financial institutions should not knowingly finance the operations 
of predatory lenders as a part of ordinary business operations. Specifically, 
the purchasing of loans on the secondary market, the direct purchase of 
loans for CRA credit, and the activities of affiliates or subsidiaries of 
federally-insured institutions should all be more closely monitored. 
The lending activities of affiliates of federally-insured institutions 
present an area of concern for policy makers because these organizations 
represent what one research organization has called the "dual mortgage 
market. ,,85 A segmented system of consumer finance has evolved, 
concentrating, it appears, higher-income homeowners as the main 
customers of the more highly-regulated banks and thrifts, and lower 
income and minority customers as primary customers of the unregulated 
banks and thriftS.86 This dual finance system has increased the potential 
for abuse in the marketplace as less sophisticated homeowners are 
identified and approached by these types of lenders. 
85 See generally DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS 
BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING AND THE UNDOING OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1999). 
86 "The practice of steering prime borrowers to high-cost lenders is an example of pricing 
that is designed to extract hannful rents." Engel & McCoy, supra note 30, at 1266. 
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These routine business financing transactions have the unwitting 
effect of stripping equity from low- or moderate-income homeowners. 
Although funded as an ordinary business transaction, loans from federally-
insured financial institutions to sub-prime and predatory lenders begin the 
vicious cycle of abusive lending. Banks find it beneficial to grant these 
loans because they receive credit for their statutory obligation to grant 
loans to persons in low- and moderate-income communities without 
having to directly make or service those loans themselves. Failure to halt 
the practices and to give CRA credit deters banks from actually managing 
a portfolio oflow- and moderate-income loans. Information asymmetries 
and credit gaps will continue to exist in contradiction to the CRA' s explicit 
statutory purpose. 
The practice of steering customers along racial or geographic lines 
to mortgage companies that are not examined by bank and thrift regulators 
contradicts the CRA's implicit and explicit purpose. Lenders active in 
white middle- and upper-income communities tend to be much less active 
in lower-income and minority communities. Conversely, many of the 
dominant lenders in lower-income areas tend not to compete heavily for 
business in more affluent areas, in part because their products are not 
competitive in that segment of the market. 87 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board should use its authority to 
monitor the activities of bank holding companies to examine the non-bank 
subsidiaries that engage in sub-prime lending for compliance with 
consumer financial services and fair lending laws.88 Financially insured 
institutions that are affiliated with sub-prime lenders could be required to 
"upstream" borrowers into the best loan product offered by the depository 
institution for which the borrowers are eligible.89 Many depository 
87 The principal regulator of mortgage companies is the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which enforces Truth in Lending regulations and fair lending rules. 15 V.S.C.A. 
§§ 41 et seq. (2005). 
88 The Federal Reserve Board supervises bank holding companies and approves bank 
merger applications and arguably has jurisdiction to review the direct lending activities of 
banks and non-bank subsidiaries owned by bank holding companies. 12 V.S.C.A. § 
1 842(B) (2005). 
89 Deregulation has resulted in banks finding competition in different product lines and in 
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institutions will refer customers who do not qualify for a loan 
"downstream" to a sub-prime lender owned by or affiliated with the 
depository institution. Since half of sub-prime borrowers could qualify for 
conventional financing, these sub-prime affiliates or subsidiaries should be 
required to refer qualified borrowers to the best loan product offered by the 
depository institution.9o 
B. Underwriting Review of Predatory Loans 
The growth of the mortgage and asset-backed securities industry 
that funds high-risk lending has played a role in the growth of the sub-
prime and predatory lending markets. The ability to securitize and sell 
sub-prime portfolios at a profit while retaining the servicing rights has 
made sub-prime lending attractive to a large number of institutions, further 
increasing the number of sub-prime lenders and loans. The question is 
whether current underwriting techniques provide an adequate basis for the 
measurements of discrimination in mortgage lending activity in order to 
distinguish the difference in treatment in the segment of marginally 
qualified borrowers. 
In both instances, whether funding or purchasing, the federally-
insured financial institution should have to conduct a due diligence review 
to determine that their participation is not abusive. Specifically, the 
Federal Reserve can adopt regulations that prohibit federally-insured 
financial institutions from making loans to or purchasing loans from a 
lender when that lender cannot show evidence of the borrower's capacity 
to repay. Similarly, using the HOEP A limitations, any lender who engages 
in high-end interest rate loans, also should be restricted from engaging in 
business transactions with federally-insured institutions. The direct effect 
will be to channel funding for sub-prime lending to those lenders who are 
responsible and engaging in risk-based pricing. 
the traditional banking cluster market becoming more fragmented. See generally Tim 
McCarthy, Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis ofEank Mergers, 
46 DUKE L.J. 865 (1997). 
90 This analysis calls for a more informed borrower, one who is knowledgeable about 
credit scores and the differences in loan products. See Cassandra Jones Havard, 
Democratizing Credif.·-Examining the Structural Inequities in Sub-Prime Lending, 56 
SYRACUSE L. REv. _ (forthcoming Winter 2006) (manuscript on file with the author). 
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C. The Fair Lending Evaluation 
As a part of the annual fair lending evaluation that banking 
authorities conduct, regulators should review and analyze the institution's 
underwriting guidelines to detennine whether the guidelines are 
quantitatively related to default. This assessment detennines if the 
predetennined underwriting guidelines are fairly applied. Additionally, 
this assessment should apply to loans that are originated at the institution 
as well as those that are purchased on the secondary market. Further, 
affiliate mortgage companies' lending should be considered when 
evaluating the fair lending practices of federally-insured fmancial 
institutions. Moreover, a more focused inquiry must be made by regulators 
awarding credit under the CRA's investment, service, and lending tests. 
Only by having a synergistic approach can both the statutory intent and the 
spirit of this law be enforced. 
Each sub-prime loan should be designed to eventually tum it into 
prime paper. A finn which creates a competitive market in which to make 
loans to non-prime borrowers, by channeling borrowers to the sub-prime 
market without identifying possible off-setting risks elements, is not 
competing on the merits, but rather engaging in behavior that may properly 
be called predatory or abusive. Although a finn may offer higher priced 
loans in order to accommodate the risk of the transaction, some practices 
of high-risk lenders abuse high-risk borrowers. 
D. Creating A Secondary Market for Sub-Prime Loans 
Congress should authorize funding for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to securitize some sub-prime loans.91 When the govemment-
sponsored enterprises encourage certain types of lending through credit 
support, credit availability increases for sub-prime borrowers who would 
91 GSEs serve important functions since, by reselling mortgages to them, banks are able to 
make more funds available for other investments purposes. Also, making more mortgage 
funds available stabilizes mortgage rates throughout the nation's housing markets. 
Bradley K. Krehely, Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the Federal 
SubSidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 519, 521 (2002) 
(discussing the history of the housing GSEs). 
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otherwise not be able to obtain a loan. There is the added benefit that sub-
prime loans would have a ready market for participation in the 
securitization market and reduce the market's reluctance to accept sub-
prime loan pools. 
As with the residential mortgage markets, when the government-
sponsored entities have developed programs for new markets, those 
programs have been well-received in the private markets. Once the GSEs 
have begun to successfully securitize these assets, it is probable that there 
will be substantial development of private pooling of sub-prime residential 
loans. The credit support should be a revolving loan fund that is available 
to originating lenders who want to reduce their exposure to the risks of 
selling a sub-prime loan on the secondary market. 
E. Definitions and Disclosures 
Congress must also re-define the sub-prime loan. The focus ofthe 
re-definition should be done with an eye towards making the sub-prime 
borrower move into the prime market. If the sub-prime loan is described 
as one that is greater than two, but no more than three points over prime, 
and secured by a residence, such a definition would capture equity loans 
secured by a residence that currently escape the HMDA's protections. 
Congress should require specific disclosures regarding yield spread 
premiums when the home loan is secured by a residence.92 Yield spread 
premiums are commissions paid to brokers who sell a loan at a higher 
interest rate than the rate for which the borrower qualifies.93 The amount 
is based on a percentage of the up-charge, but the average borrower does 
not understand that she is making an unnecessary payment and that she 
could qualify for a lower-interest rate loan. If yield spread premiums, as 
represented by loan origination fees, are definitively broken down, a 
borrower will understand all ofthe screening fees that she is being asked to 
92 See generally Taneisha Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums: Who's Working For the 
Borrower? HUD's Erroneous Regulation and Its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAW & INEQ. 367 
(2003). 
93 See Prof. Howell E. Jackson, Testimony before Senate Banking Committee, at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_01hrg/010802/jackson.htm (last visited Sept. 17,2005). 
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pay. This breakdown should be a statement of how much money is 
distributed to the originator, the processor, and the underwriter.94 In this 
way, the borrower is in fact informed and capable of making a rational 
decision. Closing the credit gap requires mandating disclosures that 
balance the exchange of information between borrower and lender. 
VI. THE ECONOMIC JUSTICE PARADIGM 
Abusive lending occurs, in part, because there is a credit gap in the 
prime lending sector that is filled by sub-prime lenders. Information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers affect credit availability.95 
When a seller has market power, the seller's dominance in the market 
excludes its competitors from serving disfavored customers. In turn, that 
imbalance can lead to "credit rationing" - the denial ofloans to would-be 
borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from successful loan 
applicants.96 
The information asymmetries play out rather dramatically in 
minority neighborhoods. Properties in minority neighborhoods 
unquestionably have lower values.97 Social services are limited and crime 
rates are higher.98 Consequently, there is little incentive for non-minorities 
to invest in minority neighborhoods by purchasing homes. The financial 
consequences of discrimination based on race and geography are 
significant. Home ownership represents shelter, wealth accumulation, and 
94 This would also clear up issues about whether these up-charges are subject to 
mandatory disclosures under TILA. See Gibson v. Bob Watson ChevroletlGeo, Inc., 112 
F.3d 283 (7th CiT. 1997). 
95 See generally Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the Waters, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 197, 209 (1998). 
96 STEFANIA Co SCI, CREDIT RAnoNlNG AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 25 (1993). 
97 See Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 70, at 8. "The lower values of black homes adversely 
affect the ability of blacks to utilize their residences as collateral for obtaining personal, 
business, or educational loans." Id. 
98 The choice to live in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood usually results in a 
decline in municipal services, e.g., fewer recreational areas, such as parks, less police 
protection and higher vandalism, poorer quality schools and limited availability of retail 
and financial establishments. See Franklin D. Wilson & Roger B. Hammer, Ethnic 
Residential Segregation and Its Consequences, in URBAN INEQUALITY, at 272,273 (Alice 
O'Connor et al. ed., 2003). 
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stability in neighborhoods. It also represents a significant source of wealth 
accumulation for middle-class persons.99 The value of the home, its 
appreciation, and its accumulated equity determine the homeowner's 
ability to access additional financing. 100 
Lenders working exclusively in a predominately segmented market 
should be required to value the human community, which should take into 
account human capital characteristics. The benefits and burdens of a loan 
transaction vary significantly with the socioeconomic, cultural, racial, age, 
and economic status of individuals; therefore, predatory lenders should not 
be allowed to escape the harm that is caused by transactions that are 
specifically designed to be financially injurious. 
Valuing the human community can require lenders to document the 
effect of a foreclosure of the subject property on the surrounding 
community. This projection, based on an evaluation of the neighborhood 
demographics, ought to establish loans that do not increase foreclosures 
because the lender is made more aware of the need to offer the borrower a 
product that is evenly priced. Valuing the human community may also 
require that lenders commit to trying to work-out the defaulting loan 
instead of foreclosing it when there is borrower default. This commitment 
could survive negotiability or the sale of the loan on the secondary 
market. 101 Subsequent purchasers must also commit to having and 
pursuing a borrower work-out plan in order to protect the borrowers who 
may find themselves in default. 
Moreover, regulatory agencies examining the lending practices of 
99 See Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 70, at 6. "[H]ome ownership makes up the largest 
part of wealth held by the middle class, whereas the upper classes more commonly hold a 
greater degree of their wealth in financial assets." Id. at 8. 
100 Wiley E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Red lining, " and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, 
Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued 
Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583 
(1996). 
101 Although beyond the scope ofthis article, a revolving loan fund dedicated to 
predatory loan work-outs might be beneficial both for lenders who have purchased the 
loans, after doing due diligence, as well for buyers who have committed to the loans, 
also in good faith. 
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financial institutions must eschew some consideration for the 
socioeconomic factors of neighborhoods, e.g., geography, race, and age, 
when evaluating the reasonableness and desirability of practices and 
policies adopted by sub-prime lenders. Only then can fair lending policy 
both protect borrowers and allow sub-prime lending to realize its 
tremendous potential to improve the availability of credit to underserved 
markets, such as the low- and moderate-income homeowners. 
This consideration of non-economic factors is fair because 
economic justice for minorities is at stake. 102 In this regard, if economic 
justice is viewed from the perspective of a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the economy, what is necessarily required is an examination 
of the rules which prevent that. Instead of concluding that the credit-
impaired borrower made the most efficient choice, it is possible to assign a 
value to the immeasurable rights of home ownership - the pride, respect, 
and self-worth of home ownership and to protect the tangible and valuable 
evidence of the homeowners' hard work and life savings. Employing this 
paradigm that is not static allows for a fairer realization of the economic 
rights and opportunities of all individuals. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Advocates of low- and moderate-income housing urge home 
ownership as an asset. Despite fair lending laws, policies that support the 
expansion of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income persons 
must be reconciled with those policies that undercut the sustainability of 
home ownership for those persons. Homeowners who cannot avoid 
foreclosure or refinance to make a non-performing loan a performing loan, 
losing some of the accumulated equity during the transaction, are trapped 
by abusive mortgages. The high failure rate of the sub-prime market 
indicates that market forces are ineffective in halting this economic abuse. 
The policies that permit the sub-prime industry to operate in an unbridled 
manner must be revised. 
102 Professor Charles R.P. Pouncy defines econormc Justice as "the absence of 
impediments or barriers to the rightful access to assets, resources, and opportunities." 
Charles R.P. Pouncy, Economic Justice and Economic Theory: Limiting the Reach of 
Neoclassical Ideology, 14 J. L. & PUB. POL'y 11,24 (2002). 
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Although there is a need for a sub-prime market, there is also a 
need for rules preventing sub-prime lending abuse. Care in formulating 
the rules will ensure that a narrow definition of the unfair practices will not 
materially deter legitimate, competitive loans. To remedy the deficiency, 
an approach explicitly based on the commonplace strategies to finance 
these operations should be taken. Allowing limited assignee liability is 
one way to regulate the funding of predatory lending. Purchasers who buy 
loans without an appropriate due diligence review to ensure that there is an 
accurate analysis of the borrowers ability to repay, and that disclosures 
regarding risks and pricing have been made, should not be able to freely 
negotiate those loans. 
The proposed reforms are critical to ensure that sub-prime lending 
does not undermine the progress made in the economic development of 
communities. Identifying sub-prime lending practices as policy choices 
that affect credit availability leads to the conclusion that failure to regulate 
some aspects of this industry will result in a lack of protection for the 
unsophisticated borrower, whose economic condition may be further 
exacerbated by unfair credit terms. 
